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Due Process and Sentencing: Third
Circuit Holds That Plea of Guilt
Waives Fifth Amendment Privilege
I.

Introduction

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
mandates that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself."' Judicial interpretation has consistently afforded
the Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination generous
latitude.2 In accordance with this principle, an abundance of case
law exists indicating the extent to which this privilege applies in the
custody, interrogation, and trial of a defendant in a criminal
action.3
In 1984, however, Congress gave the constitutional makeup of
the criminal trial a facelift by passing the Sentencing Reform Act
(hereinafter "the Act").4
The Act dramatically altered the
structure of criminal actions in its promulgation of sentencing
guidelines for convicted defendants.5 In doing so, the Act created
a separate inquiry for purposes of sentencing, requiring the kind of

1. U.S. CONST. amend V; see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding that
the self-incrimination privilege of the Fifth Amendment applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment).
2. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment
privilege ... serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed
in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.").
3. See, e.g., id.; Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973); United States v. Kahn, 728
F.2d 676, 678 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 809 (1991).
4. Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified principally at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3551-3673 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)).
5. See generally Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1247 (1997). Indeed, "[T]he federal judge in today's
sentencing ritual has little or no opportunity to consider the overall culpability of the
defendant before him. The Guidelines themselves determine not only which factors are
relevant (and irrelevant) to criminal punishment, but also, in most circumstances, the precise
quantitative relevance of each factor." Id. at 1254. Whereas in the past judges exercised
discretion in sentencing, "[T]he Guidelines require judges to address many quantitative and
definitional issues in excruciating detail, while staying away from larger questions relating
to culpability and the process of criminal punishment." Id. at 1256.
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fact finding inherent in any normal trial.6 Consequently, where the
Act was intended to create uniformity of sentencing, it has had the
opposite effect on judicial interpretation 7of the constitutional rights
available during the sentencing process.
Specifically, as this Comment will address, the issue of whether
a convicted defendant retains the right to invoke the Fifth Amendment at the sentencing stage of the proceeding has resulted in
conflicting viewpoints. Two recent cases with substantially similar
facts, United States v. Mitchell8 and United States v. Garcia,9
exemplify this conflict, and are the focus of this Comment. In
Mitchell, the Third Circuit held that a voluntary plea of guilt
unaccompanied by a plea agreement constituted a waiver of the
Fifth Amendment privilege at sentencing.1" Previously, the Tenth
Circuit had held in Garcia that the privilege extended beyond trial
and into the sentencing phase of the proceeding, even when the
defendant pleaded guilty.'
The Third Circuit's opinion ignores the fact-finding nature of
the sentencing hearing which is stipulated by the Act,12 where coconspirators become witnesses against the accused in an effort by
the government to increase the defendants level of culpability. The
sentencing hearing is still a part of the overall case in which the
safeguards of the Fifth Amendment still apply. Consequently, due
process is only secure when the criminal defendant's failure to
testify at sentencing is not determinative of his or her sentence.
This Comment takes the position that the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination must extend to the sentencing
phase of criminal proceedings, particularly when a plea of guilt has
been entered, and in light of the rigorous evidentiary requirements
under the Act. Part II of this Comment discusses the Act, its
purpose, and how it has changed the significance of the sentencing
process through its sentencing guidelines. Part III analyzes the

6. See id. at 1266. "[T]he sheer number of factual issues made relevant by the
Guidelines is extraordinary. There are literally hundreds upon hundreds of definitional
terms and factual specifications that sentencing courts may be forced to apply, and about
which appellate courts must generate innumerable, dense opinions." Id.
7. See Maurita Elaine Horn, Confessional Stipulations: Protecting Waiver of
ConstitutionalRights, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 237 (1994).
8. 122 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 1997).
9. 78 F.3d 1457 (10th Cir. 1996).
10. See Mitchell, 122 F.3d at 191.
11. See Garcia, 78 F.3d at 1463.
12. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988).
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Tenth Circuit's opinion in Garcia, and how it is consistent with the
purpose of the Fifth Amendment and prior case law.

Part IV

explains how the Third Circuit's opinion in Mitchell curtails the
fundamental rights of defendants and illustrates the adverse
consequences of denying the Fifth Amendment privilege at

sentencing. Finally, part V analyzes whether disallowing the Fifth
Amendment privilege at sentencing constitutes a penalty that
violates due process.
II.

Changes Brought By the Sentencing Reform Act
The Sentencing Reform Act of 198413 was passed in an effort

to provide more consistency and standardization in sentences being
imposed by courts.14 The Act created the United States Sentenc-

ing Commission ("Sentencing Commission")15 and empowered it
with the authority to promulgate uniform federal sentencing
guidelines ("Guidelines").

6

The goals of the Act were to pro-

mote honesty, reasonable uniformity, and proportionality in the
federal sentencing procedure. 7 The idea was to "reduce the
existing sentencing disparities yet allow sentencing judges a certain

measure of flexibility to compensate for individual circumstances.' 18 However, the Act's real impact has been to convert the
standard of sentencing process into an in-depth analysis of the
defendant's level of guilt.19
This effect is chiefly the result of the promulgated Guidelines,
which provide a formulaic approach to determining how a particular defendant will be sentenced." For example, using the facts of
Mitchell, distribution of five kilograms of cocaine carries with it,

13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998.
14. See Ellen M. Bryant, Section 3E1.1 of the FederalSentencing Guidelines:Bargaining
with the Guilty, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 1269, 1270 (1995).
15. See id. at 1305. "The Sentencing Commission is an independent body of the judicial
branch charged with the discretion to promulgate sentencing guidelines under 28 U.S.C.
§ 991 (1988)." Id. at 1270 n.il.
16. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El.1 (1990).
17. See David A. Hoffman, The FederalSentencing Guidelines and ConfrontationRights,
42 DUKE L.J. 382, 386 (1992). The Guidelines were created to "increase uniformity in
sentencing by narrowing the range of possible sentences while providing appropriate
proportional sentencing for various criminal conduct." Bryant, supra note 15, at 1272.
18. Hoffman, supra note 18, at 387.
19. See id.
20. See Bryant, supra note 15, at 1271 ("The Guidelines include a grid system that sets
out the recommended minimum and maximum sentencing range for various criminal conduct
and criminal history.").
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among other things, 21 a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years

of imprisonment, with a potential maximum life sentence.2
Judicial discretion in handing down a sentence is thus severely
limited by application of the Guidelines. Prior to the passage of
the Act, however, a judge exercised absolute discretion in deciding
how an individual would be sentenced. 23 In making this determi-

nation, judges relied on various factors, including the presentence
report prepared by a probation officer, as well as any leniency
arguments put forth by the defense.24
With the implementation of the Guidelines, however, judges
have been reduced to arbiters in an inquiry designed to elicit a

number to plug in for determination of sentencing. 25 The discretion previously enjoyed by the judge has been replaced by what
amounts to nothing more than a matrix of numbers, in which the
judge simply assigns the corresponding length of sentence mandated by the Guidelines. Consequently, "judges must conduct specific
factual determinations that have specified sentence departures
connected with them., 26 As a result, the sentencing procedure has
evolved into a "mini-trial" that has tremendous due process
implications and "significantly affect[s] a defendant's liberty
interests., 27 For this reason, the Tenth Circuit held in Garcia that

retention of one's privilege against self-incrimination at sentencing
is a due process safeguard that cannot be waived. 2

21. According to 21 U.S.C. § 841, entitled "Prohibited acts A," the penalties for
intentionally possessing or distributing up to five kilograms of cocaine are "a term of
imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years or more than life," as well as a potential
fine not in excess of $10,000,000. Id. § 841(b) (1988). This presumes that the defendant has
not previously been convicted for a violation of § 841, and also that there was no death or
serious bodily injury resulting from the use of a controlled substance, in which the case the
penalties are doubled. See id.
22. See United States v. Mitchell, 122 F.3d 85, 86 (3d Cir. 1997); see also U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (1990) (setting forth the mandatory minimum
and maximum sentences associated with various crimes).
23. See Stith & Cabranes, supra note 5, at 1248.
24. See id. at 1249-50.
25. See id. at 1255. "The judge's role is largely limited to factual determinations and
rudimentary arithmetic operations. Moreover, the Sentencing Commission has taken pains
to limit sharply the judge's authority to depart from the sentencing range that these
arithmetic calculations yield." Id.
26. Hoffman, supra note 18, at 416.
27. Id.
28. See United States v. Garcia, 78 F.3d 1457, 1463 (10th Cir. 1996).
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III. United States v. Garcia
A. Facts and ProceduralHistory of Garcia
Garcia was the first case following the implementation of the
Guidelines to specifically address the issue of whether a defendant
who pleaded guilty at trial preserves his or her right to invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination at sentencing.29 In Garcia, the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the defendant,
who pleaded guilty to the distribution of cocaine, did not thereby
waive his right against self-incrimination at sentencing.3 ° The
relevant facts are as follows.
Following a grand jury indictment on charges for drug
trafficking,3 defendant Jose A. Garcia signed a plea agreement in
which he agreed to plead guilty to distribution of cocaine.3"
Garcia's plea exposed him to a potential maximum twenty year jail
sentence.3 3 Such a threshold was reached based on the distribution of between 100 and 500 grams of cocaine.34
During the preparation of the presentence report, the
probation officer discovered that Garcia not only distributed more
cocaine than he had admitted in his plea, but had also been more
instrumental in the drug operation.3 5 Based upon this new
information, the probation officer stated in her report that,
according to the Guidelines, the amount of drugs involved elevated
the maximum penalty to forty years in jail, with a five year
mandatory minimum sentence.36
The lower court then conducted sentencing hearings to
"address the discrepancy between the quantities stipulated to by
the parties and the quantities estimated in the presentence
report."3 7 The court stated that if, after the submission of the
evidence, it found that Garcia had distributed more than the five

29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 1460. Count 1 was the conspiracy to distribute cocaine and marijuana, and
Count 5 was solely the distribution of cocaine. See id.
32. See id.
33. See Garcia, 78 F.3d at 1460.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 1461. The actual amount of cocaine involved was stipulated by the parties to
be 96.95 grams. See id.
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hundred gram threshold enumerated in the plea agreement, it
would allow Garcia to withdraw his plea.38 At subsequent
hearing, Garcia did not testify to refute the evidence being
presented against him, which the court on several occasions
noted. 39 At the conclusion of the hearing, the court stated that,
while the Fifth Amendment usually protects a defendant from
having to testify on his own behalf, such protection had been
waived when Garcia pleaded guilty to the offense.4"
Thus, in concluding that Garcia was involved in the distribution of four hundred and ninety-nine grams of cocaine, the court
relied not only on the testimony of informants,4 but also on the
fact that Garcia refused to testify on his own behalf.4 2 The district
court found that with regard to any inquiry into acts incident to the
distribution of cocaine, Garcia's plea of guilt precluded the
assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege.43 Consequently, the
court found Garcia to have been involved in the distribution of
four hundred and ninety nine grams of cocaine, whereupon Garcia
appealed to the Tenth Circuit.'
B. The Tenth Circuit's Analysis
The Tenth Circuit did not agree with the district court's view
on the issue of waiver, particularly given the fact that Garcia's
testimony may "have enhanced further his offense level for
sentencing purposes."4 5 The relevant inquiry, according to the
court of appeals, was not where or when the privilege was being
invoked, but rather the potential harm the testimony may inflict on
a defendant's due process rights.46 Very simply, the Tenth Circuit

38. See Garcia, 78 F.3d at 1461 n.2.
39. See id. at 1463.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 1461. The two informants were FBI agents and their testimony reflected
Garcia's involvement in the distribution of cocaine, including the amount they received from
him as alleged buyers. See id.
42. See id. Specifically, the district court stated that "[it was interesting to this court
on the subject of quantities here that the defendant never got on the witness stand and under
oath denied the testimony of either [the informants], although he had every opportunity to
do so, and certainly in those limited areas of role in the offense, quantity of drugs, and guns,
the Fifth Amendment is in no way implicated in this case." Id.
43. See Garcia,78 F.3d at 1463.
44. See id. at 1461.
45. Id. at 1463 n.8.
46. See id. at 1463. The court stated that "the availability of the privilege does not turn
on the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the
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was of the opinion that the testimony Garcia was requested to give
during sentencing "could have subjected him to further criminal
liability."47 In fact, the court spent little time and effort in dealing
with the Fifth Amendment claim, mainly because of the clarity of

Supreme Court precedent on this issue provided by Application of
Gault4 and Estelle v. Smith.49
Gault, a 1967 decision, held that the Fifth Amendment's
protection extended specifically into the sentencing phase of a
criminal trial.5" In addition, Gault suggests that the concern over
the applicability of the Fifth Amendment is not how it can be

waived, but rather, how it applies." In other words, the privilege
should not be viewed as an exception to the rule, but as the rule
itself."
More compelling is the landmark case of Estelle v. Smith, in
which the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment extended
unconditionally into the sentencing phase of a capital murder
trial.53 In Estelle, the issue was whether the use of a psychiatric
evaluation as testimony at sentencing violated the defendant's Fifth
Amendment rights. 4 Although the Estelle decision was rendered
prior to the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act, it is analogous
to current federal procedure under the Guidelines, and thus is
applicable here. This is because Estelle was subject to Texas
criminal law, which mandated that a capital trial be bifurcated into
guilt and sentencing phases.5
In Estelle, the original sentence handed down by the state trial
court was vacated on appeal.56 The United States District Court

statement and exposure it invites." Id. (citing United States v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975, 979
(10th Cir. 1990)); see also United States v. Jones, 640 F.2d 284, 287 (10th Cir. 1981) ("[t]here
is no question but that the Fifth Amendment does offer protection in the sentencing
process.").
47. Garcia, 78 F.3d at 1463.
48. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The Court in Gault held that "[tlhe privilege can be claimed in
any proceeding, be it criminal or civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory ... [and] it protects any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could
be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be so
used." Id. at 47-48 (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964)).
49. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
50. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 47-48; see also Jones, 640 F.2d at 287.
51. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 48.
52. See id.
53. See Estelle, 451 U.S. at 462-63.
54 See id. at 460.
55. See id.
56. See Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647, 662 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
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for the Northern District of Texas held that the trial court's failure
to advise the defendant of his right to remain silent at the pretrial
psychiatric examination contravened the principles of the Fifth

Amendment.57 The court further stated that "the failure to notify

defense counsel in advance of the penalty phase that [the psychiatrist] would testify" impinged upon the defendant's due process
rights.58 This decision was affirmed by The Fifth Circuit.

9

On appeal to the Supreme Court, the state argued that
defendant Smith was not entitled to the protection of the Fifth
Amendment during sentencing because he had already been found

guilty.6° However, the Court rejected the state's contention that
"incrimination is complete once guilt has been adjudicated,",61 and

flatly dismissed the notion that the Fifth Amendment was not
available in the penalty phase of a capital murder trial.62 The
Court stated that it could "discern no basis to distinguish between
the guilt and penalty phases of respondent's capital murder trial so

far as the protection of the Fifth Amendment is concerned.,

63

Although the severity of a potential death sentence was

certainly a factor in the Court's decision, 64 nowhere in its opinion
did the Court state that this rule should be limited solely to capital
cases. 65 To the contrary, the holding in Estelle has subsequently

been extended beyond the confines of a capital murder trial.66
Specifically, in Finney v. Rothgerber, the Sixth Circuit held that

neither the severity of the crime nor the gravity of the sentence

57. See id.
58. Id. at 657.
59. See Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1979).
60. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462 (1981).
61. Id.
62. See id. "The essence of this basic constitutional principle is 'the requirement that
the State which proposes to convict and punish an individual produce the evidence against
him by the independent labor of its officers, not by the simple, cruel expedient of forcing it
from his own lips."' Id. at 462 (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581-582
(1961)).
63. Id. at 462-63.
64. See id. at 463. "Given the gravity of the decision to be made at the penalty phase,
the State is not relieved of the obligation to observe fundamental constitutional guarantees."
Id.
65. See Estelle, 451 U.S. at 462-63. "Any effort by the State to compel respondent to
testify against his will at the sentencing hearing clearly would contravene the Fifth
Amendment." Id.
66. See Finney v. Rothgerber, 751 F.2d 858 (6th Cir. 1985) (involving a habeas corpus
proceeding following a felony conviction for theft of property). What seems even more
significant is the absence of federal case law restricting this holding to capital trials.
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should influence the applicability of the privilege.6 7 In addition,

the Tenth Circuit itself previously held that there was no doubt that
the Fifth Amendment was a constitutional safeguard of the
sentencing process, 68 and that the critical issue was the potentially
incriminating testimony itself, not where or when such testimony
was elicited.6 9 In fact, prior to Mitchell, no federal court restricted
the Estelle holding to capital trials.
Finally, several courts have held that the nature of the
determination of guilt should not affect the status of the privi-

lege.7" For example, the Circuit Court for the District of Colum-

bia in United States v. Lugg7 t held that even when the defendant
pleaded guilty to the crime, the Fifth Amendment privilege could
still be invoked at sentencing 2 Further, the Supreme Court of
Idaho held in State v. Wilkins73 that the holding in Estelle was
equally applicable at sentencing following a guilty verdict or a plea

of guilt. 74 The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Garcia was consonant
with existing authority; the Third Circuit, on the other hand, in
addressing the same issue, dismissed this precedent as lacking

foundation.
IV. A Split Occurs: United States v. Mitchell

On September 9, 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit decided United States v. Mitchell,75 thereby

67. See id. at 863. "It can be argued that Estelle v. Smith should be applied only to the
punishment phase of capital cases, in view of the emphasis the Court placed on that feature
of the case ... [However] ... we do not believe this emphasis is significant. In many
respects, the enhancement phase of a persistent felony offender proceeding is a new and
separate trial." Id.
68. See United States v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975, 979 (10th Cir. 1990).
69. See United States v. Jones, 640 F.2d 284, 287 (10th Cir. 1981).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Lugg, 892 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also United
States v. Paris, 827 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d
1219, 1235 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that it is well established that "[a] convicted but
unsentenced defendant retains his Fifth Amendment rights.")); United States v. Tindle, 808
F.2d 319, 325 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Domenech, 476 F.2d 1229, 1233 (2d Cir. 1973).
71. 892 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
72. See id. at 102-03. The court in Lugg distinguished a witness who has pleaded guilty
but not yet sentenced with one who has already been through the sentencing process, as was
the case in United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In Pardo,the court found
that since the witness had already been sentenced, the Fifth Amendment was no longer
applicable. See id. at 543.
73. 868 P.2d 1231 (Idaho 1994).
74. See id. at 1234.
75. 122 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 1997).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 103:1

causing a split in the circuits that could be reconciled only by the
Supreme Court.76 In Mitchell, the Third Circuit held that the
defendant's plea of guilt constituted a waiver of her privilege
against self-incrimination, in direct contravention to the opinion of
the Tenth Circuit rendered one year and a half prior.77
A.

The Facts of Mitchell

On October 16, 1995, Amanda Mitchell entered an open plea
of guilt to conspiracy to distribute cocaine, leaving the actual
amount for determination at sentencing.78 Nonetheless, Count I
charged Mitchell with conspiracy to distribute five or more
kilograms of cocaine, a charge that carried with it a mandatory
minimum jail sentence of ten years up to a maximum of life
imprisonment.79 Prior to entering her pleas, the court informed
Mitchell of the potential range of punishment she would be subject
to according to the plea.8" The court further explained to Mitchell
that she "would be waiving her rights by pleading guilty, including
specifically her Fifth Amendment right not to testify."'" Mitchell
then entered her open plea of guilt before the court.82
Thereafter, beginning in January 1996, nine of Mitchell's coconspirators were tried on similar charges.83 During this trial, coconspirator Richard Thompson, "who had pled guilty and agreed
to cooperate with the government," offered testimony as to the
extent of Mitchell's involvement with the distribution of cocaine.'
Specifically, Thompson stated that Mitchell had "received a one
and a half ounce bag of cocaine to sell two to three times per
week," and that Mitchell sold at this rate through December
1993.85

76. Steven Morley, who has represented Amanda Mitchell since her indictment, stated
that he filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court within thirty days of the Third
Circuit's opinion. Telephone Interview with Steven A. Morley, Esq., attorney for Defendant
Amanda Mitchell (Feb. 2, 1998).
77. See Mitchell, 122 F.3d at 191.
78. See id. at 186.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. Id. at 187.
82. See Mitchell, 122 F.3d at 187.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.

1998]

DUE PROCESS AND SENTENCING

As a result of this testimony, the government called Thompson
as a witness at Mitchell's sentencing hearing on July 2, 1996.86 At
the sentencing hearing, Thompson repeated his testimony from his
trial, and further indicated that, while Mitchell was only working
two to three times per week from April 1992 to August 1992, she
worked three to five times a week thereafter until December
1993.87 According to Thompson, on each day of "work," Mitchell
would sell one and a half to two ounces of cocaine.88 Furthermore, Thompson alleged that for the first three months of 1994,
Mitchell was in charge of distribution.89 This testimony pushed
Mitchell well above the five kilogram threshold on which her plea
was based, implicating her in as much as thirteen kilograms of
distribution, thereby doubling the range of her potential sentence. 90
B. The District Court's Analysis
As a result of Thompson's testimony, Judge Edward C. Cahn,
who presided over both the trial and sentencing phases of the
proceeding, stated that Mitchell should be compelled to testify to
defend these accusations in order to preserve the sentencing
parameters set forth in the plea agreement.9 1 Judge Cahn believed that, by virtue of Mitchell's plea of guilt, Mitchell had
waived her privilege against self-incrimination. 92 Consequently, he
held against her the failure to testify.93 Mitchell was then sentenced according to the Guidelines for distribution of approximately thirteen kilograms of cocaine, translating into a minimum ten
year jail term and six years of probation.94
The discourse between the bench and the attorneys at
sentencing clearly demonstrates Judge Cahn's uncertainty regarding
the issue of waiver for purposes of sentencing. 95 Even after
deciding that Mitchell had waived her right to remain silent by
pleading guilty, Judge Cahn called a sidebar to further discuss the

86. See id.

87. See Mitchell, 122 F.3d at 187.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id. at 188.
id.

92. See Mitchell, 122 F.3d at 188.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 103:1

implications of that holding. 96 During the sidebar, Judge Cahn

admitted that he was not clear on whether the Fifth Amendment
was actually waived by a plea of guilt, stating that if he was
incorrect in his presumption, then he would reconsider the
sentence. 97 After Judge Cahn delivered the sentence, Amanda
Mitchell appealed to the Third Circuit.
C. The Third Circuit Affirms

The Third Circuit began its analysis of the Fifth Amendment
claim put forth by Mitchell's attorney by acknowledging the right
of a defendant to refuse to testify at trial. 98 Mitchell's attorney
argued that Mitchell's Fifth Amendment rights remained intact

because Mitchell intended to contest at sentencing the amount of
cocaine she allegedly sold.9 9 The substance of the court's reasoning in affirming the trial court's sentence was based on the belief
that Mitchell's testimony could not incriminate her because she had
already pleaded guilty.0 0 Because there was no dispute about
Mitchell's notice of the consequences of her plea of guilt, the Third
Circuit believed that Mitchell "voluntarily and knowingly" waived
her Fifth Amendment privilege. 10'
The Third Circuit then turned to its own precedent, specifically
its 1991 decision in United States v. Frierson.°2 In Frierson, the
defendant pleaded guilty to bank robbery by intimidation, but
refused to admit to the charge of armed robbery.0 3 Following an
evidentiary hearing at which Frierson refused to testify, the district

96. See id. Judge Cahn stated that "Well, if I'm wrong-and let the record-you may
want to take that up because I believe that under-once she pleads guilty, it's my
understanding-or am I wrong in that... ?" Id.
97. See Mitchell, 122 F.3d at 188. Judge Cahn continued, stating: "And let's get that
tested. If I'm wrong, surely we'll have her resentenced." Id.
98. See id. at 188-89. Mr. Morley indicated that the open plea resulted from a dispute
between Morley and the government over nearly four kilograms of cocaine. Telephone
Interview with Steven A. Morley, Esq., attorney for Defendant Amanda Mitchell (Feb. 2,
1998).
99. See Mitchell, 122 F.3d at 191.
100. See id. at 189. "If a defendant's testimony cannot incriminate her, she cannot claim
a Fifth Amendment privilege." Id. Further, "if the criminality has already been taken away,
the amendment ceases to apply." Id. (quoting Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 431
(1956)).
101. See id.
102. 945 F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1991).
103. See id. at 653. Defendant Frierson admitted that he handed the bank teller a note
that said "Give me your money, I have a gun," but refused to admit that he actually
possessed a gun at that time. See id.
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court concluded that Frierson had indeed possessed a gun and
denied him a sentence reduction as a consequence of his failure to
admit it.1"4 On appeal, the Third Circuit held that a defendant
who pleads guilty to the offense "waives his privilege as to the acts
constituting" that offense." 5
Mitchell also cited the Frierson decision, as well as two other
Third Circuit opinions: United States v. Garcia"6 and United
States v. Heubel °7 In Heubel, the Third Circuit found that a
sentencing court could not penalize a defendant in deciding the
appropriate sentence when the defendant invoked his privilege
against self-incrimination.10 8 In fact, this simply reaffirmed the
holding in Garcia."9 Mitchell's reliance on Frierson due to the
fact that the court there maintained that "a denied reduction in
sentence is a penalty" under the Fifth Amendment. 1 0 Notwithstanding, Frierson's denial of sentence reduction was affirmed due
to his failure to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege at the
appropriate time, namely, before voluntarily offering the incriminating evidence.'
Although these cases appeared to be consistent with the
circumstances similar to those in Mitchell, the Third Circuit
distinguished them" 2 since they involved the applicability of the
Fifth Amendment privilege as it pertained to crimes beyond those
enumerated in the plea agreement." 3 The court believed that the
critical distinguishing factor between Mitchell and this precedent
was the exposure those defendants had to the "risk of prosecution
on other offenses."' 4 According to the court, Mitchell's situation
was outside of such precedent because the only risk to which she
exposed herself by testifying was a heavier sentence and not

104. See id.
105. Id. at 656.
106. 544 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1976).
107. 864 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1989).
108. See id. at 1111.
109. See id.
110. Frierson,945 F.2d at 660.
111. See id. at 661.
112. See United States v. Mitchell, 122 F.3d 185, 190 (3d Cir. 1997).
113. See id.
114. Id. "The issue has most frequently arisen when one of several defendants seeks to
elicit testimony from one or more of his co-defendants who have pled guilty but have not yet
been sentenced. The courts have generally permitted the unwilling witness to assert the Fifth
Amendment privilege ...." Id.
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conviction for an additional crime.115 Consequently, an open plea
that reserved the right to determine the amount of cocaine involved
6
at sentencing compelled the same analysis used in Frierson:1
once conviction for the offense has occurred, the Fifth Amendment
privilege is lost because the defendant no longer is in jeopardy of
incriminating himself or herself." 7
Additionally, although the requirements of the Sentencing
Guidelines dictate a trial-like atmosphere at sentencing, the court
stated that this context did not automatically confer upon the
defendant the Fifth Amendment privilege." 8 Specifically, the
court was concerned with sacrificing the integrity of the sentencing
stage by breaking it down to its component parts simply to allow
a defendant to "retain the privilege against self-incrimination."11 9
As a result, the Mitchell court agreed "with the suggestion in
Friersonthat the privilege against self-incrimination is not implicated by testimony affecting the level of the sentence."' 0
D. Problems with the Decision
An initial examination of the Third Circuit's reliance on
Friersonreveals several flaws in the court's analysis. First, Frierson
seems to stand only for the notion that the Fifth Amendment
privilege remains intact only if the defendant affirmatively invokes
it, as Amanda Mitchell indeed did.12' Second, the Third Circuit
in Mitchell acknowledged that it based its rationale on a footnote
in the Frierson opinion.'
However, the Third Circuit failed to

115. See id.
116. See id. at 191.
117. See Mitchell, 122 F.3d at 191 (stating that such a notion would "contravene the
established principle that upon conviction, 'criminality ceases; and with criminality the
privilege."') (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 2279 (James H. Chadbourn, ed., Little, Brown and Co.) (1961)).
118. See id.
119. Id. "Whether the defendant used a gun or had responsibility for more than five
kilograms of cocaine is not an issue of independent criminality to which the Fifth
Amendment applies in sentencing." Id.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 189. The Mitchell court even states that Frierson was properly denied the
sentence reduction not because it was not a penalty, but because Frierson had failed to claim
the privilege. See id.
122. See Mitchell, 122 F.3d at 191. The footnote to which the court refers states that "the
Fifth Amendment privilege is not implicated when a defendant is asked to talk about the
crime to which he has pled guilty and about his or her attitude concerning that crime."
United States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 656 n.2 (3d Cir. 1991). The court went on to state:
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include the critical language that appeared just lines down the page
in the body of the Frierson opinion.123

The issue for resolution

in that case was "whether a guilty plea waives the privilege with
respect to conduct that is not necessary to the offense of conviction
'
but was a part of the same episode or transaction."124
Consequently, the privilege is waived with respect only to testimony
concerning an element of the crime of conviction or testimony that

could undo the conviction. At sentencing, guilt is no longer an
issue, only the level of guilt. It follows, then, that if testimony that

could subject one to further criminal liability is protected by the
Fifth Amendment,125 and only testimony that is "necessary to the
offense of conviction" is exempted from such protection, 2 6 then

the Fifth Amendment is most vital when inquiring at sentencing
into the level of culpability of a particular defendant. Prior Third

Circuit caselaw supports this contention.
For instance, in United States v. Yurasovich127 the Third

Circuit stated that one of the rationales for extending the Fifth
Amendment privilege beyond the admission of the crime was the

fear that a defendant when asked about conduct relating to the
crime of conviction would increase his exposure to conviction for
12
another crime beyond any exposure created by the plea itself. 1
Under a strict application of the Guidelines, any additional amount

of contraband added to the charge in effect constitutes another
crime because it exposes the defendant to a longer term of
imprisonment.129
The Mitchell court even conceded that an
increased sentence is indeed a penalty, and that it would be difficult

[Alithough there may be many components to be considered in computing the
sentence [under the guidelines], one cannot logically fragment the sentencing
process for this purpose and retain the privilege against self-incrimination as to
one or more of the components . . . . Thus we agree with the suggestion in

Friersonthat the privilege against self-incrimination is not implicated by testimony
affecting the level of sentence.
Mitchell, 122 F.3d at 191 (citing Frierson,945 F.2d at 656 n.2).
123. See Frierson,945 F.2d at 657.
124. Id. (emphasis added).
125. See United States v. Garcia, 78 F.3d 1457, 1463 (10th Cir. 1996).
126. Frierson, 945 F.2d at 657.
127. 580 F.2d 1212 (3d Cir. 1978).
128. See id. at 1217-19.
129. See Frierson, 945 F.2d. at 656. The court found that "[a]n investigative interview
with an FBI agent, a presentence interview with a probation officer, and a sentencing hearing
before a court are all proceedings in which the privilege may be claimed." Id.
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to imagine another way to characterize it. 3' Thus, the penalty
analysis put forth in the Heubel and Garcia opinions were directly
relevant to the Mitchell case, and should have been given greater
consideration by the court.
Nevertheless, the Mitchell court dismissed Heubel as inapplicable to the issue before it. 31 However, in addition to setting out
the parameters under which a defendant could claim the Fifth
Amendment privilege, the Heubel court also held that a sentencing
hearing before a court is a proceeding in which the privilege may
be asserted.' 32 Furthermore, the court in Frierson maintained
that the Fifth Amendment privilege remains intact after a guilty
plea when the plea involves subsequent questioning regarding an
additional crime, which in Friersonwas the existence of the gun for
use in the robbing of the bank.133
The bottom line is that the Third Circuit's holding that a plea
of guilt waives a defendant's rights to the privilege against selfincrimination lacks merit. In fact, the court ignored mandatory
precedent to the contrary.134 The Supreme Court has specifically
held that the Fifth Amendment cannot be waived by a plea of guilt,
and that the privilege extends into sentencing.135 It is well settled
that the "[t]he Fifth Amendment privilege is 'as broad as the
mischief against which it seeks to guard.' ' 136 Furthermore, the
Third Circuit itself has stated that "when faced with a conflict
between two principles of law, one of which is embodied in statute
and tradition, and the other of which is embodied in the Constitu'
tion, that which is in the Constitution must hold sway."137

130. See United States v. Mitchell, 122 F.3d 185, 191 (3d Cir. 1997) ("The sentence is the
penalty for the very crime of conviction.").
131. See id. at 189.
132. See id. at 190 (stating that "a defendant's plea of guilt to one offense does not 'by
its own force ... waive a privilege with respect to other alleged transgressions.
(quoting United States v. Yurasovich, 580 F.2d 1212, 1218 (3d Cir. 1991)).
133. See Frierson,945 F.2d at 657; see also Yurasovich, 580 F.2d at 1218 (noting the idea
that a defendant subjected to questioning by the state retains the ability to assert the Fifth
Amendment privilege if a response concerning conduct would increase exposure to
conviction for another crime beyond exposure created by the plea itself).
134. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454
(1981).
135. See Estelle, 451 U.S. at 467.
136. Id. at 467-68 (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892)).
137. United States v. Heubel, 864 F.2d 1104, 1111 (3d Cir. 1989).
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Many of the problems with the court's opinion in Mitchell are
enumerated in the concurring opinion written by Judge Michel.138
Although Judge Michel agreed with the result in Mitchell, he was

unwilling to accept the majority's position that a defendant waives
his or her Fifth Amendment privilege "even as to facts that are not
elements of the offense charged and as to which a defendant
'
expressly 'reserved' in offering a plea."139
Judge Michel therefore
did not agree that the decision by Mitchell to leave the quantity of

drugs involved for resolution at sentencing was fatal to Mitchell's
claim.14
Judge Michel acknowledged that a plea of guilt "waives the
privilege as to all facts concerning the transactions alleged in the
'
indictment."141
However, he questioned whether this same rule
should apply in a circumstance such as Mitchell's, in which the

amount of cocaine actually distributed is not an element of the
crime of conviction.142 He was particularly troubled by the
harshness of the penalty instituted for Mitchell's silence, namely
that the mandatory minimum sentence was doubled from five to
ten years of imprisonment.1 43
Given these concerns, Judge

Michel was confused about why, in this instance, the majority chose
to tackle this complex Constitutional issue."
He thought the
wiser course of action would have been to affirm the district court

on the basis that Judge Cahn's error was harmless given the
abundant evidence of Mitchell's involvement in the cocaine
ring. 145 Nonetheless, with the majority decision on the books, an

138. See Joseph Slobodzian, No Fifth at Sentencing: The Third Circuit Says Guilty Plea
Nixes Immunity, NAT'L L.J., September 22, 1997, at A4. The Honorable Paul R. Michel of
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was sitting by designation on the three-judge
panel that heard the Mitchell appeal. See id.
139. United States v. Mitchell, 122 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 1997) (Michel, J., concurring).
140. See id. ("And what if they had? Would the trial judge then have been obligated
either to reject the plea or to refrain from relying on Mitchell's silence at all?").
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See Mitchell, 122 F.3d at 192 (Michel, J., concurring) ("Given the unsettled state of
the law among the Circuits on this important Fifth Amendment issue, I would defer a
decision on it to a case in which deciding it is unavoidable and the briefs are more
informative.").
145. See id. It is interesting to note that the brief filed by Mitchell's attorney, Steven A.
Morley, before the Third Circuit did not really address the Fifth Amendment issue, since he
believed reversal was in order because the sentence was unnecessarily harsh given the
conflicting testimony offered by the government's own witnesses. It was only ten days before
the hearing that Mr. Morley was informed that he was granted fifteen minutes for oral
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analysis of what effect the denial of the Fifth Amendment privilege
will have on due process is appropriate.
V.

Due Process and the Effect of Denying the Fifth Amendment Privilege at Sentencing

Although the Third Circuit in Mitchell agreed that the Fifth
Amendment conferred certain rights at sentencing, it did not
believe these rights to include the right to remain silent about
issues surrounding the crime of conviction.46 The court was
unwilling to recognize that an enhanced sentence resulting from the
defendant's failure to testify constituted a penalty.147 It claimed
that this unwillingness was consistent with its decision in Frier8
son.

14

A careful reading of Frierson, however, reveals that this
conclusion was not only incorrect but also was in direct contravention of Supreme Court precedent. Frierson was a "penalty" case
brought under section 3E1.1 of the Guidelines, which provides for
149
a two-level sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
There, the court explicitly stated that "[t]he characterization of a
denied reduction in sentence as a 'denied benefit' as opposed to a
'penalty' cannot be squared with the reality of the sentencing
calculation and conflicts with decisions of the Supreme Court and
pre-Guidelines decisions of this court."' 5 ° Although there is some
authority for the notion that a denied reduction is really a "denied
benefit" rather than a penalty,15' the Third Circuit rejected this
152
view.
Thus, it follows that if a denial of reduction is a penalty, then
surely an increase in the sentence must also qualify as such. The
Third Circuit stated that any other presumption would run afoul of
Supreme Court precedent. 53 Notably, in Minnesota v. Mur-

argument, and that the court was "mainly interested in the Fifth Amendment issue."
Telephone Interview with Steven A. Morley, Esq., attorney for Defendant Amanda Mitchell
(Feb. 2, 1998).
146. See Mitchell, 122 F.3d at 191.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See United States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 658 n.4 (3d Cir. 1991).
150. Id. at 658.
151. See United States v. Oliveras, 905 F.2d 623, 627-28 (2d Cir. 1990).
152. See Frierson, 945 F.2d at 658.
153. See id. "The Supreme Court's Fifth Amendment penalty cases have never drawn
such a distinction and their facts suggest the fallacy of doing so." Id.
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phy,154
' the Supreme Court held that the government may not
impose a penalty on a person for asserting the Fifth Amendment
privilege.155 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that "a
State may not impose substantial penalties because a witness elects
to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege not to give incriminating
15 6
testimony against himself.',
Clearly, the sentencing phase is when the punishment is
administered, and therefore it is crucial that one's due process
rights survive in that phase. 57 This imperative is well illustrated
in United States v. Johnson,1 58 a First Circuit opinion. Although
that case was decided before Congress enacted the Sentencing
Guidelines, it stands for the proposition that subjecting oneself to
further liability once the plea is entered is a valid reason for
invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege.159 Today, under the
Guidelines, such a standard is even more important, as any new
amount of drugs or contraband may either increase the sentence or
negate the possibility of sentence reduction. 160 As the Supreme
Court has stated: "The Fifth Amendment guarantees ... the right
of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the
unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty ... for
161
such silence.,
VI. Conclusion
The right to withhold testimony for fear of self-incrimination
is a constitutional safeguard built into our system of justice that
serves to protect an individual's fundamental rights and the concept
of due process. Clearly, increasing the length of time a person will
be incarcerated is a penalty and is precisely the type of situation for
which the privilege was created. To dispose of the privilege at the

154. 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
155. See id. at 434 ("[i]t is clear that increasing a sentence for exercise of the privilege
is a 'penalty."').
156. Frierson, 945 F.2d at 658 (quoting Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805
(1977)).
157. See, e. g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977). "Second, it is now clear that the
sentencing process, as well as the trial, must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process
Clause." Id. at 358; see also Murphy, 465 U.S. at 426 (asserting that a defendant's Fifth
Amendment protection is not sacrificed by virtue of his conviction of a crime).
158. 488 F.2d 1206 (1st Cir. 1973).
159. See id. at 1209.
160. See id.
161. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
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stage of the process when its protection is most necessary is
contrary to the basic principles upon which our system of justice is
based.
The Third Circuit unnecessarily delved into a constitutional
analysis of an issue that could have been resolved under the
doctrine of harmless error and did so in a very cluttered an
disorderly fashion. In addition, it engaged in an incomplete
analysis of the Fifth Amendment and thereby muddied the
constitutional waters. While the result in Mitchell may in fact have
been justified given the testimony offered at the sentencing hearing,
there seems to be no support for the grounds on which the Third
Circuit affirmed the conviction.
Conversely, the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Garciais consistent
with the fundamental rights guaranteed each citizen under the
Constitution and with Supreme Court precedent. Additionally, in
light of the changes brought about by the Sentencing Reform Act,
the rule set forth in Garcia ensures that due process will not suffer.
Our constitutional rights are intended to be interpreted expansively.
In order to remain consistent with this intent, the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination can not be deemed
waived merely by a plea of guilt.
Todd A. Buchman

